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INSOLVENCY OF THE DEFENDANT AS A BASIS OF
EQUITY JURISDICTION IN TORT CASES.
Roy AfoRiaND*
It is fundamental that equity has no jurisdiction if there
is an adequate remedy at law. The difficulty lies in determining
whether or not the relief at law is "adequate" in a particular
situation. An illustration of the difficulty occurs in cases where
there is a remedy at law for the injury but it would be impos-
sible to collect a judgrment because of the insolvency' of the
defendant. Is this fact, of itself, sufficient to give equity jur-
isdiction ?
The question arises frequently in both tort and contract
cases. Its determination though in either type of case should
depend upon whether the remedy at law is adequate, using the
word in a reasonable and practical sense. Its meaning in this
sense is substantially this, Could the plaintiff take the sum of
money recovered from the defendant in a law action and put
himself in the same position as if the tort had not been com-
mitted or the contract had been performed?2 Under such a
test it would seem that the remedy at law is inadequate if the
defendant is insolvent. If a judgment could not be collected
the plaintiff would not be placed where he would have been had
no injury occurred.
In spite of the apparent soundness of this deduction, there
is a wide divergence of opinion in both texts and decisions as
*Roy Moreland, A. B., Transylvania College, 1920; LL. B., "with
distinction," University of Kentucky College of Law, 1923; J. D., Uni-
versity of Chicago Law School, 1928. Professor of Law, University of
Kentucky College of Law; contributor to various legal periodicals.
'For a discussion of the term "insolvency" see Clark, Principles
of Equity, sec. 45 and note.
2Horack, Insolvency and Specific Performance, 31 Har. L. Rev. 702,
712 (1917).
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to insolvency as a jurisdictional factor in equity.3 Because of
this conflict, the following study of the problem as it occurs in
certain divisions of the field of torts, has been made.
1. WASTE
At common law a material distinction between waste and
trespass consisted in the fact that in waste the wrongdoer was
rightfully in possession. Waste may be defined as injury to the
inheritance by one rightfully in possession, but having an estate
less than a fee,--as, for example, a tenant for life or for years.
4
Quite early equity relieved against waste in certain in-
stances where for purely technical reasons there was a total
absence of a legal remedy rather than because of the inadequacy
of damages as a remedy. The intervention of equity to relieve
against waste where the inadequacy of damages was the basis
of jurisdiction came at a comparatively late date.5
Waste, because of its nature, (injury to the inheritance,
permanent damage to the land) necessarily results, if permitted
to occur, in irreparable injury. Equity has always considered
land to be unique.8 Therefore anything thati results in its per-
manent or substantial injury creates a situation where the
remedy at law in damages is inadequate. The reversioner or
remainderman is entitled to receive the land in its rightful con-
dition. No damages can compensate-him for a failure t.o do so.
It follows that an injunction should issue to prevent threatened
waste. That one will issue is firmly established.7  The original
8 See article, Adequacy of Ineffective Remedy at Law, Henry L.
McClintock, 16 Minn. L. Rev. 233.
4 "Waste is the destruction or improper deterioration or material
alteration of things forming an essential part of the inheritance, done
or suffered by a person rightfully in possession by virtue of a tempo-
rary or partial estate, as, for example, a tenant for life or for years.
The rightful possession of the wrongdoer is essential, and constitutes
a material distinction between waste and trespass." Hayman v. Rownd,
82 Neb. 598, 118 N. W. 328 (1908). Pomeroy's Eq. Jur., 4th ed., secs.
1348 and 1896; Clark, op. cit. supra note 1, sec. 183.
5 Walsh on Equity, sec. 26.
6 Henry Cox, Specific Performance of Contracts to Sell Land, 16 Ky.
L. Jour. 338.
7 Eari Bathurst v. Burden, 2 Brown, Chan. Cas. 64 (1786); Robert-
son v. Meadors, 73 Ind. 43 (1880); cases cited, Chafee, Cases on Equit-
able Relief Against Torts, page 9, notes; numerous cases cited, I Ames,
Cas. Eq. 461, note 1.
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jurisdiction to relieve where there is a total absence of legal
remedy still continues also.8
With these basic principles in mind as to the remedy of
injunction, in waste cases, the effect of'the addition of the fur-
ther element of the insolvency of the defendant will now be
considered.
Many cases state that the insolvency of the defendant is im-
material where the injury threatened will result in waste. As a
practical matter the statement is true but it is apt to be mis-
leading. It is more accurate to say that it is not necessary for
the court to consider -whether the defendant is insolvent in
order to relieve against threatened waste. According to the
principles above stated, waste alone is sufficient to give the
court jurisdiction to award an injunction since damages at law
is not an adequate remedy for permanent injury to land.
Threatened waste has become firmly established in equity as
a basis of jurisdiction; insolvency has not become well estab-
lished as a jurisdictional factor. Consequently, the insolvency
element in a particular case is ignored and the court bases its
jurisdiction upon the power of equity to enjoin waste.
Poertwer v. Russe 9 will illustrate the way the courts oper-
ate in a particular situation. In that case the plaintiff alleged
that the defendant was in possession under a lease providing
that all improvements put upon the premises should become the
property of the lessor without cost as soon as annexed and
should be left upon the termination of the tenancy. The de-
fendant put in a middling separator and attached it to the
floor. He was threatening to detach, and remove it. Insolvency
was alleged.
The court held that equity had jurisdiction in such a case
and could issue a valid injunction. The court said:
"The jurisdiction of a court of equity to entertain an action
brought by the owner of the reversion, against the tenant, whether for
life or for years, to stay waste threatened or being committed, and to
interpose its injunction to prevent such threatened waste, cannot be
doubted. This jurisdiction haa been so universally asserted and exer-
cised by courts of equity, that all of the legal remedies for waste have
tnearly fallen into disuse. The common law action for waste is of rare
a Clark, op. cit. supra note 1, sec. 185, n. 2.
933 Wis. 193 (1873). Accord, Brigham v. Overstreet, 128 Ga. 447,
57 S. E. 484 (1907); Woolworth v. 2elson, 204 Ala. 172, 85 So. 449
(1920)', noted, 19 Mich. L. Rev. 105, 5 Minn. L. Rev. 79.
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occurrence in modern times, and the various remedies given by the
statute of Gloucester (13 Edw. I., ch. 22) and other English statutes,
have given way to the action on the case for waste; and the latter, in
its turn, has been very nearly superseded by the action in equity to
stay waste. This equitable jurisdiction is sustained on the ground
that the remedy at law is at best an inadequate one. Of course, there
can be no remedy at law until the waste is actually committed, and it
is well settled that the reversioner need not wait until waste has actu-
ally been committed before bringing his action."'
0
The court then considered the alleged insolveney of the
defendant and concluded that this allegation was not needed to
give equity jurisdiction. Said the court:
"Within the principles above stated, this is enough to give the
court jurisdiction to award the injunction without the further aver-
ment of insolvency of the defendant.""
Although it is not necessary for the court to consider the
insolvency of the defendant in order to obtain jurisdiction in a
case of theatened waste, it may become a very material juris-
dictional factor where waste has already occurred. In such a
situation if the waste has consisted in creating chattels by sev-
erance from the land the remedy at law is ordinarily adequate
unless they are unique. If equity takes jurisdiction and grants
an injunction against their removal it must be because of some
factor other than waste. Will the insolvency of the defendant
supply such necessary factor?
In Watson v. Hunter.12 the court gave a negative answer to
this question by way of dictum. In that case the defendants
were in possession of land under a lease. They were cutting
down large quantities of timber. The plaintiff asked for an in-
junction against cutting down any more timber and also from
removing that already cut. The defendant was neither alleged
nor proved to be insolvent but the court said that even in the
event of the possible inability of the defendant to respond in
damages an injunction would not lie. Said the court:
"This court will stay the commission of waste, or the transfer
of negotiable paper in certain cases in order to prevent irreparable
mischief; but the only mischief that can arise in the present case as
to the timber already cut and drawn to the mills of the defendants is
the possible inability of the party to respond in damages. That is a
danger equally applicable to all other ordinary demands, and it is not
10 Ibid. 199.
Ibid. 201.
39 5 Johns Ch. 169, 9 Am. Dec. 295 (N. Y. 1821).
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an impending and special mischief, which will justify this extra ordi-
nary preventive remedy by injunction."13
It is submitted that the attitude expressed by the dictum
in the above case is not the proper one. It is true that as a
general rule equity will interfere only to restrain future waste
and will not interfere in a case of waste already committed.
That is because in the first situation the remedy at law is not
adequate, while in the latter one it is generally adequate. But
there may be very special circumstances which should cause
equity to interfere in a case of wasta already committed. In a
case where waste has resulted in creating chattels, severed from
the land, non-unique in character, and the wrongdoer is insol-
vent, equity should prevent him from removing them or de-
stroying them, because in such a situation the remedy at law
is inadequate.
This result was reached in Spear v. Cutter.14  Therein an
injunction was granted not only restraining the commission of
future waste but also preventing the removal of timber already
cut. The defendant was insolvent. Under these circumstances
it was held that the injury would be irreparable if the defend-
ant were permitted to remove or dispose of the timber he had
cut. IA would appear that this holding is more in accord with
practical equitable principles than the dictum in Watson v.
Hunter, supra.15 It would further appear that the remedy at
law under present codes is adequate in the absence of the de-
fendant's insolvency.
2. Trespass in the Nature of Waste.
Suppose the plaintiff is rightfully in possession of land.
The defendant is threatening an injury, which because of its
nature would amount to waste were he in rightful possession.' 0
But because of the technical distinction between waste and
trespass such an injury would be a trespass. Such cases are
21 Ibid. 172.
245 Barb. 486 (N. Y. 1848).
Is "Where waste has consisted in creating chattels by severance
from the soil, equity will not enjoin their removal from the land even
though an injunction against future severance is asked and given,
unless the defendant is insolvent or other special circumstances ap-
pear." Clark, op. cit. supra n. 1, sec. 189.
20 See authorities cited, supra n. 3.
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not real trespass cases but rather situations of trespass in the
nature of waste. Equity will grant an injunction for the same
reasons as in cases of technical waste.17
Suppose in such a case that the further element of the in-
solvency of the defendant is added to the facts. Is it a mate-
rial factor in determining whether equity has jurisdiction to
grant an injunction in the case ? In this situation as in the case
of threatened waste by one who is insolvent, courts ignore the
factor of insolvency and base their jurisdiction upon the power
of equity to prevent trespass in the nature of waste.
For example, in Richards v. Dower's the defendant had
excavated and projected a tunnel under the lot of the plaintiff
i distance of 15 feet, and was engaged in its further extention.
His insolvency was alleged but the lower court found that he
was not, in fact, insolvent. The appellate court held that the
injury was a, trespass in the nature of waste and that an in-
junction should have been granted without regard to the sol-
vency or insolvency of the defendant, that it was an immaterial
circumstance. 19
3. Trespass Not in the Nature of Waste.
The general rule supported by anany cases is that equity
will not restrain a trespass which is not in the nature of waste.
20
The basis of the rule is evident, the remedy at law is usually
fully adequate. But there are cases of trespass where the
remedy at law is not adequate and equity has shown a willing-
ness to extend its injunctive protection in such instances on the
theory of preventing irreparable injury.2 ' The place which the
17Lowndes v. Bettle, 3 New Reports 409, 33 L. J. Oh. 451 (1864);
Erhardt v. Boaro, 113 U. S. 537 (1885). See also, Chafee, op. cit. supra
n. 6 pp. 35-40.
1164 Cal. 62, 28 Pac. 113 (1883).
""The gravamen is a threatened trespass upon land. The tres-
pass is in the nature of waste, and it will be committed unless the de-
fendant is restrained. Should the threat be fulfilled, the plaintiff
would be deprived of a part of the substance of his inheritance, which
could not be specifically replaced. In the class to which this case be-
longs no allegation of insolvency is necessary." More v. Massini, 32 Cal.
190, 594 (1867).
"Mehitable Gates v. Johnston Lumber Co., 172 Mass. 495, 52 N. E.
736 (1899); Carney v. Hadley, 32 Fla. 344, 14 So. 4 (1893); Deegan v.
Neville, 127 Ala. 471, 29 So. 173 (1900); 32 A. L. R. 463, 464; 14 R. C.
L., Injunctions, sec. 143.
-3 Boston Univ. L. Rev. 242.
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insolvency of the defendant plays in such extension presents an
interesting phase of the general problem.
(1) Repeated Trespasses.
Equity will enjoin a succession of trespasses which threaten
to be repeated indefinitely. 22 This jurisdiction is generally put
upon the ground of avoiding a multiplicity of suits. Some
cases base the jurisdiction upon the prevention of the acquisi-
tion of an easement. 23 It has been suggested that this basis is
unsound since the plaintiff could prevent this by a physical in-
terruption of the user or by bringing a suit before the close of
any statutory period.24 But theplaintiff should not be forced
to rely on self help and if the statutory period is short a mul-
tiplicity of suits will be necessary.
'Where the facts present a situation of repeated trespasses
plus the insolvency of the defendant what is the jurisdictional
value of the insolvency element in the case.
In Paige v. Akins25 the plaintiff asked for an injunction to
prevent the defendant from harvesting and removing a crop
from hiq land. The court considered the evidence of the insol-
vency of the defendant to be sufficient to establish his inability
to pay damages and granted an injunction. The facts of the
case raise this important query, Is there an adequate remedy at
law for repeated trespasses occurring over a short period of
time?
If the plaintiff were compelled to bring a separate action at
law for each trespass it is evident that such a vexatious and ex-
pensive remedy would not be an adequate one. But he is not
confronted by this difficulty where the trespasses ard all com-
mitted to the same subject matter by the same defendant over
a short period of time. He may recover in one action at law
2B. & M. R. Co. v. Sullivan, 177 Mass. 230, 58 N. E. 689 (1900);
Murphy v. Lincoln, 63 Vt. 278, 22 Atl. 418 (1891); Mendelson v. Mc-
Cabe, 144 Cal. 230, 77 Pac. 915 (1904); McClellan v. Taylor, 54 S. C.
430, 32 S. E. 527 (1899); New York, N. H. & H. R?. Co. v. Scoville, 71
Conn. 136, 41 Atl. 246 (1898); Lernbeck v. Nye, 47 Ohio St. 336, 24 N.
E. 686 (1890); 5 Pom. Eq. Jur. sec. 1910, note 22; 32 A. L. R. 463, 465.
"Murphy v. Lincoln, 63 Vt. 278, 22 Atl. 418 (1891).
31 Clark, op. cit. supra n. 1, sec. 195; WalAh, op. cit. supra n. 1,
sec. 30.
1112 Cal. 401, 44 Pac. 666 (1896).
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for all trespasses down to the bringing of his action.28 It would
appear then that there would be an adequate remedy at law in
the principal case were it not for the insolvency of the defend-
ant. The court apparently came to this conclusion and based
its injunction upon this sole ground. There is no mention in
the opinion of repeated trespasses or other possible reasons for
the holding. Quite a number of other courts have reached the
conclusion that the insolvency of the defendant is sufficient to
give equity jurisdiction in cases of repeated trespasses occur-
ring over a short period.
2 7
Suppose though that the repeated trespasses instead of oc-
curring at frequent intervals over a short period are threatened
to be continued indefinitely or over a long period. In the var-
ious actions for damages the amounts recovered are not likely
to be large in comparison with the costs o attorneys' fees and
incidental expenses and the vexation of actions necessary to pre-
vent the running of each successive statutory period, particu-
larly if it be short, is sufficient to constitute a real hardship.
28
In such cases the remedy at law is not adequate.2 9
It would appear thiat in cases of this character the solvency
" "It is urged that the complainants would be put to numerous suits
at law and hence the bill has equity upon the doctrine of the preven-
tion of a multiplicity of suits. It cannot be denied but that the com-
plainants might in one action at law sue to recover all of the sur.
charges paid for the entire cotton season. One suit or a multiplicity
of suits therefore would be a matter of complainant's own election.
There being no necessity for a multiplicity of suits the reason for the
interference of a court of equity on the principle mentioned fails." Gulf
Compress Co. v. Harris, Cortner Co., 158 Ala. 343, 48 So. 477 (1908)
See Leach v. Harbough, 3 Neb. (Unof.) 346, 91 N. W. 521 (1902); Tigard
v. Moffitt, 13 Neb. 565, 14 N. W. 534 (1882).
" West v. Smith, 52 Cal. 322 (1877); Harms v. Jaeobs, 158 I1. 505,
41 N. E. 1071 (1895); Hicks v. Compton, 18 Cal. 206 (1861); Sooy
Oyster Co. v. Gaskill, 69 AtI. 1084 (N. J. 1908).
21 Clark, op. cit. supra n. 1, sec. 195 with cases in the notes; Walsh,
op. cit. supra n. 1, sec. 30, note 22.
" "Injunctions will not be granted to restrain simple trespasses,
but, when persistently repeated and of long continuance, courts of
equity will interpose to prevent irreparable mischiefs, or to suppress a
multitude of suits and oppressive litigation." 2 Story's Eq. Jur., 928.
Terry v. Rosell, 32 Ark. 478, 489 (1877); Cragg v. Levinson, 238 Ill.
69, 87 N. E. 121 (1908); Missouri Pao. R?. Co. v. Hobbs, 178 Ark. 1146,
13 S. W. (2d) 610 (1929); B. & M. R. Co. v. Sullvan, 177 Mass. 230, 58
N. E. 689 (1900); Murphy v. Lincoln, 63 Vt. 278, 22 AtI. 418 (1891);
Mendelson v. McCabe, 144 Cal. 230, 77 Pac. 915 (1904); McClellan v.
Taylor, 54 S. C. 430, 32 S. E. 527 (1899); New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.
v. Scoville, 71 Conn. 136, 41 AtI. 246 (1898); Lembeck v. Nye, 47 Ohio
St. 336, 24 N. B. 686 (1890); 5 Pom. Eq. Jur. sec. 1910, note 22; 32 A.
L. R. 46.3, 465. Contra, Washburn v. Miller, 117 Mass. 376 (1875).
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or insolvency of the defendant is immaterial. Equity has jur-
isdiction to prevent a multiplicity of suits without the added




Much of the discussion in the preceding section will apply
to cases of continuing trespasses. Where the continuation of a
trespass is threatened to be continued indefinitely an injunc-
tion lies and the solvency or insolvency of the defendant is im-
material.3 1 If the continuing trespass is likely to occur though
over a stiort period it would appear that the remedy at law is
adequate, if the defendant is solvent. The plaintiff would be
able to recover in one action at law for all damages down to the
bringing of the action. But if the defendant is insolvent the
remedy at law is not adequate. In such a case it is the insol-
vency of the defendant, it is submitted, which is the jurisdic-
tional factor in the case.
(3) Asportation of Chattels.
Generally equity will not restrain the asportation of per-
sonal property because the remedy at law is fully adequate.
3 2
Where the chattel is unique though and the defendant is threat-
ening to seize it and carry it away, equity will grant an in-
junction to prevent the injury but in such a case the solvency
or insolvency of the defendant is immaterial since the jurisdic-
tion of equity is based upon the protection of unique property.
3 3
But where the chattel is non-unique the insolvency of the de-
fendant becomes a material factor for without that element the
remedy at law is adequate.
In Kaufman v. Weiner3 4 it was alleged that the defend-
ants, trespassers and. insolvent, were tbreatening to take cord-
wood belonging to the plaintiff. The court said that these alle-
gations made a case upon the face of the bill authorizing the
30'Musselman v. Marquis, 1 Bush 463 (Ky. 1866); Boston & M. R.
Co. v. Sullivan, 177 Mass. 230, 58 N. E. 689 (1900); O'Brien v. Murphy,
189 Mass. 353, 75 N. E. 700 (1905); see cases abstracted, 32 A. L. R.
498-502.
Poirier v. Fetter, 20 Kan. 47 (1878); Bryant v. West, 219 S. W. 355
(Mo. 1920); Gause v. Perkins, 56 N. Car. 174 (1857).
' Watson v. Hunter, 5 Johns. Ch. 169 (N. Y. 1821); Worthington v.
Moon, 53 N. J. Eq. 46, 30 AtI. 251 (1594).
1' Saiers v. Sanders, 20 Ark. 610 (1859); see cases, 1 Ames Cases
in Eq. Jur. 532-533.
169 Ill. 596, 48 N. E. 479 (1897).
K. L. J.-2
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interference of a court of equity to restrain such threatened
injury to the property of the plaintiff. In this situation the
remedy at law is fully adequate in the absence of insolvency so
it would appear that this. factor is the material jurisdictional
one in such a case. Other jurisdictions have come to this con-
clusion, where the defendant was insolvent in the case of threat-
ened asportation of non-unique chattels, which would amount to
a trespass.
35
It seems that in most of the tort cases which have been
considered the solvency or insolvency of the defendant is ig-
nored by the courts in determining whether equity has jurisdic-
tion to grant relief. But apparently there are certain definite
situations where the insolvency of the defendant is the jurisdic-
tional factor since the remedy at law is fully adequate in the
absence of this element. These situations are:
(1) 'Where a repeated trespass or a continuing trespass is likely to be
committed by an insolvent defendant over a short period of time,
the remedy at law is adequate in the absence of the element of
insolvency.
(2) Where the asportation of non-unique personal property is threat-
ened, the insolvency of the defendant becomes a material factor in
giving equity jurisdiction to grant preventive relief for in its ab-
sence there is an adequate remedy at law.
"It is therefore held that in such cases an averment of the de-
fendant's insolvency is necessary, for, if he is not insolvent, and the
plaintiff can recover an equivalent in money for the loss sustained by
the trespass, the damage cannot in any proper sense be called irre-
parable." KistZer v. Weaver, 135 N. C. 388, 47 S. E. 478 (1904).
